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It is proposed to ascertain in this paper, with 
special reference to South Africa, the legal scope of 
Rules 27, 28 and 29 of the United Nations General 
Assembly Rules of Procedure. These Rules which relate 
to the question of credentials are as follows: 
Rule 2 7: 
Rule 28: 
Rule 29: 
The credentials of representatives and the 
names of members of a delegation shall be sub-
mitted to the Secretary-General if possible not 
less than one week before the opening of the 
session. The credentials shall be issued 
either by the Head of State or Government or 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
A Credentials Committee shall be appointed 
at the beginning of each session. It shall 
consist of nine members, who shall be appointed 
by the General Assembly on the proposal of the 
President. The Committee shall elect its own 
~i cers. It shall examine the credentials of 
representatives and report without delay. 
Any representative to whose admission$ a 
Member has made objections shall be seated 
provisionally with the same rights as other 
representatives until the Credentials Committee 
has reported and the General Assembly has given 
its decision. "Credentials" can be defined as a 
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document issued by the Head of State or 
Government or by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of a State Member of the United Nations sub-
mitted to the Secretary-General designating the 
persons entitled to represent that Member at a 
given session of the General Assembly. 
The Credentials Committee is a non-plenary, 
procedural committee of the General Assembly: its main 
task is to examine the validity of the credentials of the 
United Nations member states' delegations to the General 
Assembly and then submit its report to the General Assembly 
for approval. The composition of the committee is based 
on an informal agreement before the opening of the session. 
The United States, and the Soviet Union are usually among 
the members. At the 29th Session of the General Assembly 
the following states made ,up the Committee: ·Belgium, 
·~ China, Costa Rica, Philippines, Senegal, U.S.S.R. Tanfania, 
U.S.A., and Venezuela. It should be noted that by virtue 
of G.A. Resolution 396(V), the General Assembly recommended 
that whenever a question arises on the legality of a 
government, this question should be considered by the 
Ge neral Assembly or its Interim Committee and the attitude 
adop ted by these organs should be taken into account in 
other organs of the United Nations and in the specialised 
agencies. 
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Usually, approval of credentials is a formal
ity. 
In practice, most problems that do arise, ari
se not out 
of the authenticity of the credentials, but f
rom the 
competence of those who issued them. On a fe
w occasions, 
the opportunity has been taken to challenge t
he 
credentials as a means of challenging the leg
ality of a 
government, rather than in order to point out
 mere 
procedural errors. 
Apart from the procedural requirements mentio
ned 
in Rule 27, no criteria are set down in the G
eneral 
Assembly's Rules of Procedure which may be re
levant to the 
situation where the legality of a government 
is disputed. 
An analysis of past credentials cases may hel
p to clarify 
the position. 
Past Credential Cases 
Past credentials 9ases can be divided into 2 
major 
categories - (1) where rival governments cla
im to be the 
sole representative of the member state, 
and 
(2) where there is no rival government but 
the government has reached or remains in 
power in a manner unacceptable to the 
majority of the member states of the 
United Nations. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
4. 
Ethiopia 
The first acute credentials case in the context 
of a world-wide international organisation was that of 
Ethiopia in the League of Nations. By 1937 it would be 
true to say that Ethiopia was under the control of Italy 
as a result of a bitter and often savage war. At the 
seventeenth Assembly, an Ethiopian delegation presented 
its credentials as it had done in the past. The Corrunittee 
on Credentials was faced with a very delicate problem in 
its interpretation of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure. 
Rule 5: 
1. Each member shall corrununicate to the 
Secretary-General, if possible one week 
before the date fixed for the opening of 
the session, the names of its representative, 
of whom there shall be not more than three. 
~ 
2. The full powers of the representatives 
shall be delivered to the Secretary-General, 
if possible, one week before the date fixed 
for the opening of the session. They shall 
be issued by the Head of State or by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
3. A Corrunittee of nine members for the examination 
of the full powers shall be elected by the 
Assembly on the proposal of the President. The 
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Corrunittee shall appoint its own Chairman 
and Vice-Chairman. It shall report without 
delay. 
4. Any representative to whose admission 
objection has been made shall sit provisionally 
with the same rights as other representatives, 
unless the Assembly decides otherwise. 
(These rules were similar to those of the United 
Nations General Assembly.) If it admi'tted an Ethiopian 
delegation whose credentials had been issued by the exiled 
Haile Selassie, it would be opening the debates of the 
Assembly to persons who could not carry out its resolutions. 
On the other hand by recognising Italian sovereignity over 
Ethiopia, the Corrunittee and the Assembly could be seen to 
be impliedly accepting the activities of a belligerent 
~ Q 
Member State which had blat,ntly violated the League's 
Covenant. Interesting from the point of view of this paper, 
is that the question of credentials was treated as a sub-
stantive issue and not as a merely procedural matter. 
F.P. Walters in his book A History of the League of Nations, 
corrunents at P. 689, "In the past the appointment of the 
Credentials Corrunittee and its proceeding, once appointed, 
had been a matter of quick moving routine, necessary to the 
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Assembly as to every other international conference, but 
totally devoid of political interest .... ". 
In the end, the Credentials Committee resolved 
the problem by stating that the credentials offered were 
derived from the same authority that had issued those 
unquestionably accepted by previous assemblies. In view 
of the situation in Ethiopia, could these credentials be 
held to meet the League's requirements? The members of 
the Credentials Committee were unanimous in their desire 
not to deny their validity. They therefore recommended 
that, since the rules of procedure provided that unless the 
Assembly decided otherwise, any representative to whose 
admission objection had been made should sit provisionally 
with the same rights as other representatives, the Ethiopian 
credentials should be considered sufficient to permit its 
delegation to be seated. This was approved ~y the Assembly. 
~ 
The only inference that can be drawn from this case 
is that the legitimacy of origin of the authority issuing 
credentials was the criterion deemed to be the most 
appropriate to be applied. Since Italy controlled the 
country the acceptance of Ethiopian credentials was clearly 
based on a fiction. ·Yet the Member States opted to 
recognise this fiction. The Ethiopian credentials complied 
on a very tenuous basis with the rules of procedure, for 
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Haile Selassie was no longer the effective
 Head of State, 
the King of Italy having replaced him. A 
further factor 
to be taken into account seems to be the q
uestion of 
recognition this important problem will be
 treated in 
greater depth later on in the paper. How
ever, it seems 
clear that the majority of the Member Stat
es were not 
prepared to recognise the King of Italy as
 Head of State 
of Ethiopia at this stage, at least. 
China 
From 1949 to 1971, the credentials ~ssued 
by the 
Nationalist Chinese Government were challe
nged by the 
U.S.S.R. on the grounds that the Nationa
lists did not 
represent China and that the Communist rep
resentative 
should take the Nationalist representative
's place since 
it was contended that he was legally entit
led to the position. 
The question of the representation of Chin
a originally arose 
as a question of credentials. The General
 Assembly 
repeatedly decided that the representation
 of China should 
be considered as a matter of credentials, 
which in the 
opinion of the General Assembly, was a pro
cedural question. 
The question of representation was conside
red to be an 
important question in regard to China requ
iring a two-thirds 
majority. (G.A. Resolution 1668 XVI). 
Until October, 1971, 
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the General Assembly had taken the view that the Nationalist 
Government was the lawful one and that credentials signed 
on its behalf were valid credentials for the delegation of 
China. Rules 27, 28 and 29 might have been invoked to 
discuss the legality of the Taiwan Government had it not 
been for the fact that the question of China's representation 
was, from 1961, placed on the General Assembly's agenda and 
debated openly in the General Assembly, rather than in the 
context of a report of the Credentials Committee. 
Hungary 
The Hungarian credentials case is perhaps the most 
akin to the South African problem in that it did not 
involve the question of rival authorities claiming to 
represent the Member State. At the twelfth session of the 
General Assembly (1957), the Credentials Committee adopted 
as U.S. motion to "take no decision regarding_ the credentials 
> 
( 1) 
submitted on behalf of Hungary". The representative of 
Hungary protested against what he termed a U.S. attempt at 
discrimination and interference. The credentials of his 
delegation, he declared, had been issued in conformity with 
the requirements of the Hungarian Constitution and the 
General Assembly's Rules of Procedure. Notwithstanding 
this, the General Assembly approved the report of the 
Credentials Committee. This decision should be viewed 
(1) U.N.G.A. docs. - 12th Session. 
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against the bade drop of the United Nations Report of the 
Special Committee on the problem of Hungary which refused 
to consider the Kadar Government as representing the 
Hungarian people (U.N. document A/3592). The decision 
to take no action on the Hungarian credentials was a 
condemnation or harsh disapproval by the majority of the 
Assembly of the Kadar Government. It is clear that the 
latter were in effective control of the country. Never-
theless it was felt that to accept the Hungarian credentials 
would be to condone the means by which the Kadar government 
had obtained power. Many states therefore did not wish to 
recognise credentials signed on behalf of this government, 
but most states did not wish to reject these credentials 
either. The General Assembly accordingly decided at each 
of its sessions between the 11th and 17th to take no decision 
regarding credentials submitted on behalf of the representatives 
of Hungary. This meant th~t the credentials were not approved, 
but that the Hungarian delegation could (provisionally) 
participate in the session. After the 17th session, the 
Hungarian credentials were no longer challenged. 
The Iraqi credentials case was dealt with in the 
context of the Security Council. After the revolution in 
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1958 which resulted in the death of King · Feisal, an 
interesting problem of representation arose. After the 
overthrow of the old government, an attempt was made by 
the new government to issue credentials to a new Iraqi 
representative in the Security Council of the United Nations. 
The Secretary-General received a communication to this 
effect signed merely "The Minister of Foreign Affairs", 
but giving no name. The Secretary-General suggested that the 
cable was not in order as far as the credentials were 
concerned. 
The representative of the United Kingdom argued 
that Mr. Abbas had been given his credentials by a 
government (although overthrown) that was legitimate and 
that he should continue to sit in the Security Council under 
Rule 17 of the Security Council Rules of Procedure until a 
vote came about rejecting his credentials. (It should be 
noted that the Security Council Rules of Procedure on 
credentials are very similar to those of the General Assembly -
Rule 29 in the General Assembly would be the equivalent of 
Rule 17 in the Security Council). Subsequent to this, the 
Secretary-General received a letter from the new Iraqi 
Government authorising Dr. Jawad to appear in the Security 
Council as the representative of Iraq. The letter was signed 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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"A. Jounaro, Minister of Foreign Affairs". This was 
considered to be acceptable and accordingly Dr. Jawad's 
credentials were deemed to be valid. 
The inference may be drawn that the test of 
effective control over the country seems to have been 
the decisive criterion applied in this case. The fact the 
the new Iraqi Government obtained power through force 
initially, at least, made certain Members, e.g. the United 
Kingdom, reluctant to accept the new credentials. In the 
final analysis, however, this factor took second place to 
the criterion of effectiveness. This is to be contrasted 
with the Hungarian and Ethiopian cases where the reverse 
occurred. 
Yemen 
Following the revolt in the Yemen in 1962, credentials 
were submitted by both the~Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Kingdom of the Yemen and by the President of the Yemen 
Arab Republic. The royalist delegation was seated provisionally 
in the General Assembly in accordance with Rule 29 but sub-
sequently the Credentials Committee recommended to the General 
Assembly that the credentials issued by the President of 
the Republic be approved. The General Assembly ultimately 
approved the report of the Committee. 
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The criteria applied in coming to this decision 
seems to have been the test of effectiveness. In other 
words, who was in effective control of the country? 
legitimate Government of the Imam Al-Badr or the new 
The 
Government headed by Brigadier Al-Sallal. It was felt by 
the majority of Members that the latter fulfilled this 
requirement. 
It is to be noted that the rules in regard to 
credentials were interpreted in a substantive rather than 
merely procedural manner because it was first of all 
necessary to establish who was the authorised person to issue 
the credentials. 
Congo (Leopoldville) 
In 1960, Congo-Leopoldville was admitted as a member 
of the United Nations, however, no delegation was seated 
due to the unstable political and constitutional situation 
prevailing in the country., At the time ~'-le Credentials 
Committee had to decide whether to recommend to accept the 
Credentials of the delegation issued by President Kasavubu 
or those of the representative of Prime Minister Lumumba. 
The Ghanaian representative submitted information from 
Leopoldville upholding the view that under the Congolese 
Consitution the Prime Minister was responsible for Foreign 
• 
0 
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Affairs. It was suggested by the Government of the 
President that as there were credentials issued by 
President Kasavubu, it would be an intrusion into the 
domestic affairs of the Republic of Congo to question the 
validity of a document issued by a Head of State. It was 
also argued that the duty of the Credentials Committee 
was to pass judgment on the legal validity of the credentials 
(i.e. the procedural requirements) and that it should not 
take into account political considerations. The Soviet 
representative made reference to the Kasavubu credentials 
being contrary to the formalities required by the Congolese 
Constitution, hence introducing an internal element for the 
Committee to measure validity against. 
The Committee, however, recommended that the 
credentials issued by the President be accepted and the 
General Assembly approved this. Due to the apparent lack 
of clarity as to who was in effective control of the country, 
s 
discussion was largely ba~ed on the constitutional position 
in the Congo. It may be said that implicit in Rule 27 is 
the notion that a Head of State supersedes a Prime Minister 
in terms of capacity to issue credentials; this may also 
be a general principle of international law . . One may deduce 
from this credentials case that the internal law of a member 
state is irrelevant to the question of competence to issue 
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credentials. Perhaps an anology may be found in Article 
46 of The Vienna Convention in the Law of Treaties which 
provides that: "A state may not invoke the fact that its 
consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in 
violation of a provision of its internal law regarding 
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent 
unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of 
its internal law of fundamental importance". On the other 
hand, in the case of treaties internal law can be invoked, 
to a limited extent, to ascertain the validity of a State's 
consent to a treaty; in the field of credentials, a State's 
constitutional law does not seem to have the same significance. 
Despite variations in the scope of power wielded by 
contemporary Heads of State in the conduct of external 
relations, they are as a rule empowered to appoint diplomatic 
officers and representatives in international institutions and 
conferences. Furthermore foreign diplomats are accredited 
to them. It would seem therefore, that a Head of State has 
precedence over a Prime Minister in terms of capacity to 
issue credentials, notwithstanding the possibility that a 
violation of internal law may have occurred as a result of 
such action. 
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Discussion of Past Credential Cases 
Before embarking upon an analysis of the South 
African case, it would be appropriate to point out the 
divergent views that exist on the question of credentials. 
When credentials have been challenged, the problem has 
centred around the legitimacy of the authority issuing the 
credentials. 
The main criteria to be applied in order to resolve 
e1is question appears to be the test of effective control 
and possibly the view that regard should not be had to the 
internal law of the member state. On the question of 
ef f ective control conflicting views have been expressed, 
e.g. the U.S.A. constantly argued that Rules 27, 28 and 29 
were nerely procedural in regard to the challenge by the 
Communist states to the Nationalist Chinese Government's 
credentials; yet, it was the U.S.A. which instigated the 
move to take no action on Hungary's credentials which ful-
filled the procedural requirements of the General Assembly's 
Rules of Procedure. Although those credentials were not 
rejected, the point is that the U.S.A. used the Rules on 
credentials to show its disapproval of a regime in a context 
that it had previously deemed to be purely procedural. 
It can be seen that Rules 27, 28 and 29 are not 
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wholly procedural but also raise substantive issues when 
rival authorities claim to represent the one Member State. 
It remains to be determined what is the legal scope of the 
rules regarding credentials where there are no rival 
authorities claiming representation of the Member State. 
South Africa 
Although past credential cases all differ to a 
greater or lesser extent, the position of South Africa is 
unique. One is not dealing with a government that has gained 
power through a revolution, or is opposed by a rival 
Government, but with a government whose domestic racial policies 
have come under increasing criticism in the United 
Nations. The paroxysm of this attack was reached in 1974 
when South Africa was prevented from participation in the 
General Assembly proceedings. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the problem, it is appropriate to consider 
the main events that led up to South Africa's de facto 
expulsion from the General Assembly. 
The history of South Africa's troubles in regard to 
its credentials date back to 1958 when at the eighteenth 
session of the General Assembly, in the Credentials Committee, 
Algeria, the U.S.S.R. and Liberia thought "the time had come 
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for the United Nations to undertake a review of the validity 
(I 
of credentials submitted by South Africa. The South African 
Government, in their view, was not "representative of the 
people of South Africa and .... persistently violated the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and continued to 
defy resolutions adopted by the United Nations Organs". (2) 
In 1965, once again in the Credentials Committee, 
the U.S.S.R. said that four-fifths of the people of South 
Africa were victims of unprecendented colonialist oppression 
and racial discrimination and were deprived of various 
fundamental rights, in particular the right to vote. The 
U.S.S.R. therefore considered that the representatives of 
the Government of South Africa did not legitimately represent 
the people of South Africa. The Committee decided, however, 
to recommend acceptance of its First Report', including the 
credentials of the South African representatiyes. This report 
was put to the General Assembly and an amendment was proposed 
and approved by the General Assembly. This amendment stated 
that the Assembly would take no action on the credentials 
of the representative of South Africa. As in the case of 
Hungary, this decision was seen as a strong disapproval of 
the South African Government's policies. It is to be noted 
( 2) United Nations General Assembly docs. 18th Session or, 
Report of the Credentials Cormnittee. 
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that the scope of the rules in regard to · credentials was 
extended beyond mere procedural matters, taking into 
account political factors and thereby raising substantive 
issues. 
In 1966, a new development took place whereby the 
General Assembly approved the report of the Credentials 
Committee which expressed strong reservations in regard to 
the representatives of South Africa. 
In 1970, the situation changed dramatically. The 
representative of Somalia stated that Somalia did not recognise 
the South African delegation as representative of all peoples 
of South Africa, black and white. He cited rule 27 of the 
General Assembly's Rules of Procedure and challenged the 
South African credentials in the General Assembly moving 
that the Assembly request its Committee on Credentials to 
consider as a matter of ur·gency the credentia.ls of the South 
African delegation. The Credentials Committee considered 
the Somali request yet recommended approval of South Africa's 
credentials. 
When the Credentials Committee report was submitted 
to the General Assembly, an amendment was proposed which 
would approve the Committee's report "except with regard 
r 
r 
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to the credentials of the representatives of South Africa". (3) 
For the first · time, the Assembly had before it a 
statement by the United Nations Legal Counsel (U.N. 
document Al8160) regarding the scope of the rules on 
credentials. This paper will be discussed in greater depth 
at a later stage, however, it is clear that in the legal 
opinion, the rules on credentials were seen primarily as 
rules of procedure rather than of substance. The President 
of the Assembly, Mr. Hambro, stated that if the amendment 
were to be approved, he would interpret the rejection of 
South Africa's credentials as not meaning that the South 
African delegation would be unseated - in other words, this 
move would not, in his opinion, affect South Africa's powers 
to participate in the proceedings of the General Assembly. 
As a result, the Assembly approved the first report of the 
Committee except with regard to the credentials of the 
representative of South Africa. 
In 1974, for the first time the Credentials 
Committee advised the rejection of the South African 
credentials. The General Assembly, as on previous occasions, 
approved the Committee's recommendation and then called upon 
the Security Council "to review the relationship between the 
(3) O.R.G.A., 25th Session, Supplement No. 28. 
Resolution 2636 A (XXV). 
• 
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United Nations and South Africa in the light of the 
constant violations by South Africa of the principles of 
the Charter and the Universal Declaration~ of Human Rights 11 • ( 4) 
This move was clearly an attempt to have South Africa 
expelled from the Organisation in accordance . with Article 
6 of the Charter. (S) 
The Security Council defeated this draft proposal 
by way of the veto votes cast by the U.S.A., France and the 
United Kingdom. 
The President of the Assembly took the view that, 
notwithstanding the decision of the Security Council II on the 
basis of the . consistency with which the General Assembly 
has regularly refused to accept the credentials of the 
delegation of South Africa, one may legitimately infer that 
the General Assembly would in the same way reject the 
credentials of any other delegation authorised by the 
Republic of the Government of South Africa to represent it, 
which is tantamount to saying in explicit terms that the 
General Assembly refuses to allow the delegation of South 
Africa to participate in its work.( 6 ) This interpretation 
was approved by the General Assembly; as a result, South 
Africa was excluded from the Assembly. 
(4) General Assembly Resolution 3207 (XXXIX). 
(5) Article 6. A Member of the United Nations which has persistently 
violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be 
expelled from the Organisation by the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council. 
( 6) A/PV. 2281. 
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Recognition versus Representation 
The view seems to have been taken by some member 
states opposed to South Africa that approval of credentials 
amounts to recognition. The attitude of Somalia is such 
an example. It may be argued that to accept the credentials 
of a representative of a Member State is in effect, to 
recognise that Government as the representative of the State 
Member. But the legal opinion delivered in 1970 (Doc Al8160) 
states "Unlike the acceptance of credentials in bilateral 
relations, the question of recognition of a Government of a 
Member State is not involved .... 11 (in the General Assembly). 
This opinion corresponds with an earlier opinion delivered 
on 8 March 1950 dealing with the legal aspects of the problem 
of representation of states in the United Nations. The 
memorandum stated II Since recognition of either State or 
government is an individual act, and either admission to 
membership or acceptance of representation in the organisation 
are collective acts, it would appear to be legally inadmissable 
to condition the latter acts by a requirement that they be 
preceded by individual recognition ... the members have 
made it clear by an unbroken practice that -
(1) a member could properly vote to accept a 
representative of a govenment which it did 
not recognise, or with which it had no 
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A United Kingdom draft resolution on representation 
was very similar in that the predominant test was that of 
effective control. Recognition, it was stated, was not a 
factor to be taken into account. Rosalyn Higgins, in her 
book, The Development of International Law through the 
Political Organs of the United Nations (p. 148) comments: 
"The United Kingdom, believing representation to 
be a question quite distinct from recognition 
thought that an objective test was needed which 
implied no moral or political approval of the 
Government concerned. Refusal to allow a 
Government exercising effective control to 
represent a State meant that the State was 
being denied its right as a Member." 
Finally it was decided that whenever more than one 
authority claims to be the' government entitled to represent 
a Member State, the question of representation should be 
decided in the light of the Principles and Purposes of the 
Charter. (G.A. Resolution 396 (V)). 
Resolution 396 (V) appears to be a somewhat vague 
guideline, but it is interesting to note that recognition 
was not seen as a necessary prerequisite to representation 
f ' 
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of a particular Member State. The Assembly declared "that 
the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or ·its Interim 
Committee concerning and such question shall not of itself 
affect the direct relations of individual member states with the 
state concerned". Resolution 396 (V). 
P.B. Potter in his article Membership and Representation 
in the United Nations 49 A.J.I.L. 234 (p. 235), adopts the 
opposite view in relation to China. "The Members of the 
United Nations are entirely free to decide upon recognition 
of the Communist government of China as the representative 
' thereof in accordance with the terms of the Charter, the facts 
as they see them, and their own policies .... the Members of 
the United Nations are also entirely free to refuse to admit 
Red China to the United Nations - so to speak - with possible 
similar results". 
It is submitted that the better view is contained in 
the Memorandum by the United lJations Secretariat of 8 March 
1950 (referred to earlier). It would appear that implicit 
in the Charter is the right of Members to be represented by 
the authorities which under international law are to be 
regarded as their government. It is suggested that H.M. Blix 
in his article Contemporary Aspects of Recognition 130 
Recueil des Cours 1970 II 593 (p. 693) is correct when he 
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states: "However, by accepting treaties constituting 
international organisations, they (States) must be deemed 
to have obliged themselves to accept the measure of 
relations which is necessary under their constitutions -
but no more - with authorities which fulfil the international 
law criteria of governments of state members, although in a 
pursuit of a policy of non-recognition, they may refuse 
relations outside the framework of such organisations". 
It is suggested that an objective test for 
representation based on effective control is most desirable 
if applied consistently. Furthermore, it would seem that in 
cases of representation, recognition of a government should 
not be a valid consideration. 
The Question of Credentials versus that of Representation 
Hitherto, the question of credentials and of 
representation have been somewhat intertwined. It is now 
hoped to make a distinction between these two concepts. 
General Assembly Resolution 396 (V) was specifically 
concerned with representation in relation to a situation 
where more than one authority claimed representation of a 
Member State. It was recommended that the problem should 
be resolved in the light of the Charter. South Africa is 
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in a different position, for it is clear that the South 
African government is the sole and effective government 
in the country. In this case it is suggested that the 
question of representation does not arise since this 
concept is mainly concerned with rival governments. The 
rules on credentials in the case of South Africa should be 
strictly construed and relate to the authenticity of the 
documents, the identity of the delegates and the scope of the 
powers conferred upon the delegates. On the surface, the 
rules on credentials are designed for that very purpose and 
should, it is suggested, b~ treated as such whenever possible. 
It therefore may be argued that the decision by the 
Assembly to reject South Africa's credentials was ultra vires 
because considerations extraneous to the procedural issue such 
as the question of recognition and the status of the Soue1 
African Government were taken into account. Jhe South African 
delegation had complied with the requirements of Rules 27, 28 
and 29; accordingly, the view may be advanced that their 
credentials should have been approved by the General Assembly. 
Legal Effects of Alleged Abuse of the Rules of Procedure 
Article 21 of the Charter specifically states that the 
General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
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This could be interpreted as meaning that the Assembly 
is "master of its own procedure" and consequently that 
the majority's views will always supersede those of the 
majority. In fact, the rules of procedure are usually 
followed, otherwise the General Assembly would ground 
to a halt. On occasions, however, exceptions to the 
principle of strict adherence to the rules of procedure 
should be allowed in terms of practical utility and flex-
ibility, provided that the derogations involve matters of 
minor importance. The problem of South Africa's credentials 
is, however, more difficult - one cannot point to a rule 
which has been blatantly breached, e.g. a resolution 
requiring qualified majority would be such an example, if 
it were passed on the basis of a simple majority. The fact 
is that the legal scope of rules 27, 28 and 29 is uncertain 
and Member States can invoke reasonable arguments supporting 
the view that South Africa's credentials should be rejected 
on the basis that its government does not represent the 
total population of South Africa. 
Looking at the practice of the General Assembly, 
it would seem that there is no opportunity to determine 
whether a resolution is ultra vires or not, apart from a 
ruling by the President on the matter. It would seem that 
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the majority of Member States are the ultimate judges 
of the legality of a resolution. This can lead to a 
great deal of uncertainty, especially in regard to states 
such as South Africa which do not have the benefit of 
the majority's goodwill. 
At this stage, it is appropriate to inquire into the 
means by which greater certainty can be arrived at when 
dealing with the rules of procedure relating to credentials. 
One possible avenue would be for. the General 
Assembly to request an Advtsory Opinion on the matter from 
the International Court of Justice. In 1950, the United 
Kingdom proposed that the Court should give an opinion 
indicating the relevant criteria to be taken into account 
in regard to the question of the representation of States 
in the United Nations. Many Members thought that this was 
inadvisable and that every case should be decided on its 
own merits; as a result the Court was never allowed to set 
forth the criteria to be given regard to in relation to 
representation. 
It is probable that a resolution asking the Court 
to give an indication of the scope of the rules on credentials 
would suffer a similar fate. Most regrettably because an 
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advisory opinion delivered by the International Court 
of Justice, although not binding, would give persuasive 
guidelines as to the scope of the rules on credentials, 
thereby giving greater certainty to the procedure of the 
General Assembly. 
Another proposal would be to amend the rules on 
credentials in accordance with Rule 164 (B)of G.A. Rules of 
Procedure so as to enable the General Assembly to exclude 
delegations whose validity in terms of representation is 
doubtful. The writer does not suggest that this is the best 
approach, however, it would, at least, give any decision 
to exclude a delegation some sort of legal basis. 
If such action is not taken the Assembly will 
continue to be absolute "master of its own procedure" within 
this delicate field, with the result that abuses such as an 
illegal interpretation of 'the rules on credentials cannot 
be reviewed in a judicial manner. 
Consequences of the Rejection of Credentials 
In 1974, the President of the 29th General Assembly 
Session, Mr. Bonteflika, based his ruling, which in effect 
excluded the South African delegation from the General 
Assembly, on the grounds that Mr. Harnbro's ruling in 1970, 
(8) These rules may be amended by a decision of the General 
Assembly taken by a majority of the Members. 
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was confined to the amendment (to the Credentials Committee's 
report) as it was then worded. The 1970 amendment was 
worded to the effect that the credentials of all Members be 
approved "except with regard to the credentials of the 
representative of South Africa". In 1974, no amendment was 
necessary as the Committee itself: "Accepts those credentials 
of representatives of Member States to the twenty-ninth 
session of the General Assembly that have already been submitted 
with the exception of the credentials of the representatives 
of South Africa". (9) 
It might be argued . that Mr. Bonteflika was correct on 
the basis of the distinction between the two means by which 
the General Assembly came to reject the South Africa's 
credentials. However, it is submitted that this difference 
in rulings introduces a great deal of uncertainty. It would 
appear that a delegation may or may not be d~prived of partic-
ipation in the General Assembly depending on who happens to 
be the President at the actual time. The U.S.A. representative 
at the Assembly challenged the President's ruling on a point 
of order, arguing that the Assembly cannot deny a Member state 
its right to participate in the Assembly's work other than 
in accordance with Articles 5 or 6 of the Charter which both 
require the recommendation of the Security Council. Expulsion 
had clearly failed due to the veto votes of the U.S.A., France 
(9) Doc. A/9779. 
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and the United Kingdom in the Security Council. The view 
was taken that participation in meetings of the General 
Assembly is one of the important rights and privileges of 
membership and that suspension of this right through the 
rejection of credentials would be contrary to the Charter. 
On the other hand, one might argue that a Member State can 
only participate through its duly accredited representatives 
and that rejection of _these representatives' credentials 
precludes them from participation. 
It is submitted that the American view is to be 
preferred. The exclusion of a delegation is a very serious 
matter indeed and should be administered in accordance with 
the Charter. Nowhere in the Charter is there express provision 
for the exclusion of a delegation apart from suspension or 
expulsion of the Member State itself. It is suggested that 
the exclusion cannot be implied in the context of a rule of 
procedure. 
It is therefore submitted that the President's 
ruling, preventing the South African delegation from partic-
ipating in the General Assembly, was contrary to the Charter 
and, consequently unconstitutional. Benedetto Conforti in 
his Article The Legal Effect of Non-Compliance with Rules of 
• 
• 
r. 
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Procedure in the United Nations General Assembly and 
Security Council 63 A.J.I.L. 479 (p. 486) comments that 
"non-compliance with the internal rules of procedure by 
the majority of the General Assembly .... amounts to a 
violation of the Charter whenever it results in the impair-
ment of the individual state's right to express its opinion 
or whenever normal internal procedure is seriously subverted". 
It would seem that once a ruling excluding a delegation has 
been passed by the majority of Members, there is nothing 
the minority can do to have the decision reviewed. There is 
no provision for an appeal ,to a judicial body to pronounce 
judgment on the legality of the resolution and this appears 
to be a grave defect in the system. The criteria to be 
applied in determining the scope of Rules 27, 28 and 29 seem 
to depend on which government's credentials are being examined. 
This lack of unifofmity suggests that. the majority's 
will shall always be the decisive factor even if the decision 
is illegal. The General Assembly is an organ whose function 
is to deal with international problems having a predominantly 
political nature, hence, the need that the discussions be 
carried out in accordance with rules which may impartially 
guarantee to each Member State an effective participation in 
the work of the organisation. 
i. 
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The thesis of this paper is to show that the 
rejection of the South African credentials was illegal 
in that the decision was ultra vires and that the expulsion 
of the South African delegation from participation in the 
General Assembly was unconstitutional. Fundamental to 
these two contentions is the argument that where no rival 
authorities claim representation of a Member State, Rules 
27, 28 and 29 should be interpreted strictly as rules of 
procedure as opposed to rules raising substantive issues. 
By way of conclusion, it is suggested that if the 
rules on credentials are interpreted as questions of the 
legality of government, the United Nations will be converted 
into an organisation of like-minded governments, thereby 
ceasing to be a universal institution. It is quite possible 
that at the 30th session of the General Assembly the Israeli 
delegation might be excluded from the General Assembly. 
Obviously such a course of action can only help to defeat the 
aims of the United Nations. 
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